Senegal’s unsustainable economic growth. by Konteye, Amadou
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Dissertations and Theses City College of New York 
2019 
Senegal’s unsustainable economic growth. 
Amadou Konteye 
CUNY City College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/804 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
    Senegal’s unsustainable economic growth by Amadou Konteye 
 1 
2018-2019 MASTERS THESIS   
 
Acknowledgement 
Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my mentor, Professor Nicholas Rush 
Smith for the continuous support of my research, for his patience and motivation. The Research 
Methods course with Professor Smith was the preliminary stage of this thesis, and his mentorship 
helped me throughout the process. 
 
My gratitude also goes to Professor Jean Krasno, Professor Kimberly Gamble-Payne, Professor 
Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, and Professor Jong Wan Baik in the Program of International 
Affairs, who have intrigued, and sharpened my thinking throughout the journey. Also, Professor 
Ahmed Elkhouly’s quantitative method course and my friends in the Program of International 
Affairs. 
 
At last, my deepest appreciation goes to my mother and brother, whose support has been vital to 









    Senegal’s unsustainable economic growth by Amadou Konteye 
 2 
Contents  
Acknowledgment                                                                               1 
Contents                                                                   2 
Abbreviations        3 
Chapter 1  
1.1 Introduction        4-5 
Chapter 2 
2.1 Literature Review       6-11     
2.2 Democratic-led       6-7 
2.3 Market-led development      7-9 
2.4 State-led development       9-11 
Chapter 3 
3.1 Argument        12-14 
Chapter 4 
4.1 Pre-Colonial Senegal      15-18 
4.2 Colonial Senegal       19-30 
Chapter 5  
5.1 Political Transition      31-46 
5.2 Post-Colonialism       46-50 
Chapter 6 
6.1 Transition         51-56 
6.2 Conclusion         56-59 
 
    Senegal’s unsustainable economic growth by Amadou Konteye 
 3 
Abbreviations 
AD                             Anti-dumping mechanisms  
A.O.F                         Afrique Occidentale Française (French West Africa)  
BDS                           Bloc Democratie Senegalais  
CFA/ FCFA               Colonies Francaises d’Afrique franc  
GATT                        General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
GDP                           Gross Domestic Product  
HCCT                         Haut Conseil des Collectivites territoriales  
IMF                             International Monetary Fund  
LDC                            Less Developed Countries 
MFDC                         Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance 
 
OIF                              Organisation international de la Francophonie  
PAI                              Parti Africain de L’Independance (African Independence Party)  
PSS                              Parti Socialiste Senegalais  
 
PRS                                 Parti pour le Regroupment Africain (Party for African Regroupment)  
PDS                             Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (Senegalese Democratic Party)  
PS                                Parti Socialist (Socialist Party) 
PTA                            Preferential Trade Arrangements  
RND                            Rassemblement national democratique (National Democratic Rally) 
SFIO                           Section francaise de L’Internationale ouvriere  
UPS                              Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (Senegalese Progressive Union) 
WWI/ WWII                World War I/ World War II  
WB                               World Bank 
WTO                             World Trade Organizations  
    Senegal’s unsustainable economic growth by Amadou Konteye 
 4 





1.1 Introduction  
As with countries in Latin America and Asia, starting in the 1960s, African states have 
been referred to as part of the Global South, the Third World, less developed countries/region 
(LDC), or developing countries. Yet, despite these similar terms, in the decades since 
decolonization, many Asian countries have managed to sustain economic growth, while many 
African countries have failed to attain a similar economic miracle. What might explain this 
regional divergence? Many economists argue that the two primary obstacles to development in 
Africa are the uneven nature of its political institutions and the poor behavior of politicians. 
Moreover, they argue that the best means for promoting sustained economic growth is the 
adoption of democratic political systems and market-led economies. 
This thesis engages these arguments by looking to a particular case where one may have 
expected sustained economic development: Senegal. Specifically, the thesis asks, what has 
impeded Senegal’s economic growth. I focus on Senegal because it has been regarded as one of 
the most stable democracies in Africa and has, in recent years, adopted market-led economic 
    Senegal’s unsustainable economic growth by Amadou Konteye 
 5 
development plans. However, Senegal has suffered from the same lack of economic growth as 
many other African states and Senegal’s debt spiked in recent years, but it managed to maintain 
lower external debt than the rest of its neighbors. Moreover, in line with international best 
practices the economy is increasingly transitioning to a service economy. In the period of 2006-
2013, service sectors, such as communications, trade, tourism, financial, and business services 
were the principal growth industries in Senegal’s economy.1 
The question is why Senegal has not experienced sustainable economic growth despite a 
robust democracy and market economy. I argue that Senegal lagged economically for much of its 
history because of its colonial legacy. Specifically, in the early decades of independence, Senegal 
did not sustain economic growth because the regimes in power chose to maintain close 
relationships with its former colonial ruler, France. Since Senegal gained independence in 1960, 
the administrations of President Senghor and President Diouf maintained the colonial 
relationship in which the French dominated the majority of the economic sectors in Senegal. 
However, in a period of 12 years during President Wade’s two terms from 2000 until 2012, 
Senegal’s economy grew. What explains this economic shift? I argue that President Wade 
implemented an economic plan by attracting diverse external economic partners, rather turning 
primarily to France for trade, breaking with long-standing patterns from the country’s colonial 
period in which Senegal’s political and trading networks had been dominated by the country’s 
métis population which had tight relationships to France. 
 
 
                                                 
1Cinyabuguma Matthias, Ndoye Djibril & Taiwo Olumide. Leveraging the Potential of the 
Services Sector to Support Accelerated Growth in Senegal 
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Chapter 2 
2.1 Literature Review 
Economists and politicians have debated what engine best drives economic growth or 
economic development. Some are proponents of democratic led development, while others 
advocate market-led development, and still others advocate for state-led development. None of 
these approaches, however, can account for the comparatively poor performance of Senegal’s 
economy, given that Senegal has long had a robust democratic system, adopted a market-led 
development strategy in the early 1990s, and used elements of a state-led development approach 
in the 2000s. In brief, these studies misidentify the politics of development. 
2.2 Democratic-led 
As with many studies of democracy and development, I understand democracy as a 
political system based upon free and fair elections in which citizens have a right to vote. 
Democracy is often argued to be an important element for enabling development because 
democracy can help foster highly functioning institutions. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson argue that institutions are “the fundamental cause of income differences and long-run 
growth.” 2 However, political leaders’ and elites’ commitment problems can impede economic 
growth as investors worry that their investments might be expropriated by the state. Elections 
help solve this commitment problem and extend investors’ time horizon. Even though elected 
leaders might not keep their promise once in office, people can vote them out office during the 
next election. Therefore, if the political leaders want to remain in office, they must deliver on 
those promises.  
                                                 
2Acemoglu Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson. “Institutions as the Fundamental Causes of 
Long-Run Growth.” NBER Working Paper Series 10481: 64-65. 
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Solving this commitment problem may not necessarily result in quick economic growth. 
For example, Przeworski suggests that it would be “erroneous” to argue that democracy 
generated rapid economic growth because “the average rates of growth of total income was about 
the same” across democratic and non-democratic regimes and dictatorships had higher rate of 
production..3 Nonetheless, democracies tend to be more efficient than dictatorships in the long-
run, suggesting that “democracy is far from perfect, but democracies pay higher wages, use labor 
more effectively, and benefit more from technical progress.”4 
Expounding on sustainable development and democracy, Andrea Westall found 
democracy and development “overlap, interdependent, and reinforcing” through “participation-
the ability of people to come together and be involved in decisions about how to live and the 
goals they want to achieve as societies.”5 However, similar to the previous authors’ point about 
commitment problems, Westall highlighted the inequality and unequal distribution of resources 
as “tensions and differences” to be resolved in order to foster sustainable development. In sum, 
democratic-led development requires well-functioning political institutions as prerequisite for 
development.  
2.3 Market-led development 
While some scholars focus on the importance of democracy for development, others 
examine the importance of the market. Since Western, capitalist states allied at the Bretton 
Woods Conference, market institutions have been an important hallmark in our modern global 
economic system. Any state could negotiate to join the global economic institutions by agreeing 
                                                 
3Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and Economic Development. Department of Politics New York 
University  
4Ibid. 
5Westall, Andrea. 2015. The Relationship between Democracy and Sustainable Development. 
Foundations For Democracy And Sustainable Development  
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to the liberal principles of “reciprocity and nondiscrimination, which entail the reduction of trade 
barriers.”6 The question is what kind of effect the global free trade regime represented by these 
institutions has on economic growth.  
For example, studies by Crowley point toward the 20th century of trade treaty and 
multilateral trade agreements of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and World Trade 
Organizations (GATT/WTO) indicate member countries benefit from trade (even though, the 
economic size of the country matters).7 The production, exports and imports of a particular 
country serves as important factors in gaining market access in order to spur economic growth. 
Crowley, like many others accept that there are problems within the economic systems 
established by the Bretton Woods Conference. Despite the increased membership of the World 
Trade Organization, this very trade system permitted some forms of discrimination. For example, 
its members could practice exclusionary policies toward other members. To wit, Senegal has 
been a member of the WTO, yet it does not have market access to all the members of WTO. One 
example is the non-reciprocal preferential access between European Union and Senegal.8 
In examining the market economy based on GATT/WTO, Allee and Scalera pointed out 
that for automatic joiners, the former colonized countries have no impact on the trade flows, 
because of protectionist policies and “lack of mandated trade policy changes.”9 However, 
Easterly and De Soto disagreed, and stressed the devastation produced by unregulated market 
                                                 
6Crowley, Meredith A.,2003. "An introduction to the WTO and GATT," Economic  
Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q IV:42-57. 
7Ibid. 
8International Trade Center. “ITC by Country Report Senegal 05/12/2014.” 
http://www.intracen.org/country/senegal/Domestic-and-Foreign-Market-Access/: 20 
9Allee Todd L., Scalera Jamie E. 2012. “The Divergent Effects of Joining International 
Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accessi 
on.” International Organization 66 (2): 265.  
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economies. LDC countries have been vulnerable to the shocks of the global market, interest rate, 
and trade terms.10 In addition, the dependency of LDC within the market economy was 
problematic. For example, the mobility of technology and flow of capital were limited and 
regulated by the developed countries.11 Correspondingly, the global market institutions followed 
the liberal principle of free trade, but power politics has always been infused in these institutions 
because states often pursue their individual interests.  
The barriers to liberal trade have been the implications of states forming Preferential 
Trade Arrangements (PTAs) and employing anti-dumping mechanisms (AD), which are 
flexibility provisions allowed by the World Trade Organization. PTA enables states to maximize 
benefits, but the majority of the developing countries are at a disadvantage forming PTAs due to 
the lack of expert representatives.12  On the other hand, states that imposed AD have substantial 
benefits, but the implementation of an effective domestic AD legal institution is costly, requiring 
“time, expertise and resources.” More than one hundred, countries have implemented ADs, but 
many developing countries abstained from implementing effective ADs because of domestic 
constraints, and superficial tariff binding commitments.13 In reality, the free trade system has 
never been fully free undermining its benefits, particularly for less powerful states, like Senegal, 
in the global order. 
 
                                                 
10Easterly, William. 2001. “The Lost Decades: Developing Countries’ Stagnation in Spite of 
Policy Reform 1980-1998.” Journal of Economic Growth 6:135-157.  
11 De Soto, Hernando. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and    Fails 
Everywhere Else. Basic Books, 2000. 
12Mansfield Edward D., Reinhardt Eric. 2003. “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The 
Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Agreements.” International 
Organization 57 (4): 829-862. 
13Kucik, Jeffrey, Reinhardt Eric. 2008. “Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application 
to the Global Trade Regime.” International Organization 62 (3): 477-505. 
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2.4 State-led development  
While some scholars advocate for the power of markets to lead to economic 
improvements, other scholars focus on the importance of the state to lead economic 
development. East Asian states, like Japan, are commonly used as examples of successful state-
led development. Prior to Western colonial expansion in Asia, Japan has had well-functioning 
domestic institutions. The multiple actors such as the state, communities, and individuals 
maintained a “national identity,” which allowed Japan to respond well to “external shocks, and 
used them positively for change and new growth.”14 The Japanese state competed to catch up 
with the technological prowess of the west. Japan had certain characteristics that were missing in 
the former French colonies in Africa. The Japanese state was unified, and accompanied by a 
strong leadership. However, in the former French colonies like Senegal, the building of national 
identity started after it gained independence from France.  
Equally important, the rapid growth in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand was also a state led development. Castel-Branco called the 
East Asia’s success “a superior model of accumulation,”15 which included firms, state 
intervention, and comparative advantage exports. The states reformed their economies toward 
complex industrial economies by incorporating technological development. By maintaining a 
market-friendly orientation, these Asian states intervened to make domestic firms competitive in 
the global market or to make market correction.  
                                                 
14Ohno, Kenichi. The Economic Development of Japan The Path Traveled by Japan as a 
Developing Country. Yuhikaku 2005: 4. 
15Castel-Branco, Carlos Nuno. 1996. What Are The Major Lessons From East Asian 
Development Experience?  
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Within the same region, China’s economic rise has been a particularly marked example 
of the way state-led development can spur rapid economic growth. The World Bank ranked 
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) as second after the United States. On the road to 
economic development, China excluded privatization, but focused on competition.16 
Furthermore, Chinese leadership implemented a socialist market economy based on “selectively 
free” economy. Despite being an authoritarian state, with “ultimate control” enforced in all 
sectors within the society, China had a significant labor force, big domestic market, and engaged 
with the global markets for foreign investments, technological and other expertise in 
management.17  
Since the state is the principal political agent in the global system it “has always a role to 
play in a capitalist system and no country’s economy is either purely a state capitalist or free 
market system, but the degree of government intervention varies within each country and 
fluctuates over time.”18  Given the Asian cases and the claim made by Przeworski on regime 
types and the rate of economic growth, the studies focused mainly on European and Asian 
countries, in which the colonial impact was experienced differently than the countries in Africa. 
This differing institutional history suggests the need to develop alternative explanations for 
economic lags across much of the African continent – a task we pursue in the remainder of the 
thesis with specific reference to Senegal. 
 
                                                 
16Weitzman, Martin L.1993. “Economic transition Can theory help?” North-Holland European 
Economic Rewew 37: 549-555.  
17Zhao, Suisheng. 2010. The China Model: can it replace the Western Model of Modernization? 
The Journal of Contemporary China. 
18Lambin, Jean-Jacques. Rethinking the Market Economy: New Challenges, new ideas, new 
opportunities. State-Led Market Economy. Palgrave Macmillan 2014 




By focusing on the role of the actors within specific governing institutions, I argue that 
we can best explain Senegal’s economic lags by understanding its politics. And the key to 
understanding its politics is understanding the relationship among French and Senegalese elites – 
relationships that continued to be shaped by the country’s colonial history. Specifically, because 
Senegal’s independence was negotiated by the Senegalese political elites and the French political 
elites, this negotiated independence involved a reproduction of elites, with the effect that this 
reproduction of elite politics has failed to serve the majority of Senegal’s population. The effect 
of this relationship between the two countries’ elites has been to hold Senegal back from 
diversifying its economic partners regionally and internationally. 
The relationship among local and colonial elites matters - especially, the metis nobility, 
also known as Signares, creoles or mulâtres, a mixed-race population from the union of French 
officials or traders and Senegalese women. Predominantly concentrated within the French urban 
communes of Saint Louis, Goree Island, and Dakar, “metis of Senegal were among the earliest 
groups in West Africa to pursue western education.”19 Furthermore, they were in prominent 
government positions: military,20 civic, business, and served as the economic and political 
intermediary between France and Senegal. The metis’ economic prospects were linked to France. 
                                                 
19Jones, Hilary. “Citizens and Subjects: Métis Society, Identity and the Struggle Over Colonial 
Politics in Saint Louis, Senegal, 1870-1920.” Michigan State University Department of History 
2003: 138.    
20Taylor, Mildred E. “How a Senegalese Mulatto Ended One of Africa's Oldest Kingdoms for the 
French.” Face2Face Africa, 31 Jan. 2019, face2faceafrica.com/article/how-a-senegalese-
mulatto-ended-one-of-africas-oldest-kingdoms-for-the-french. 
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Therefore, the metis had to serve France’s economic interest in order to safeguard their economic 
investments – a pattern that continues to impact modern Senegal.  
In general, the metis were the first negotiators for certain individual liberties and 
Senegal’s representation within the French colonial system and in its aftermath. Metis replicated 
the bourgeoisie lifestyle of the Parisian metropole by maintaining strictly French culture, 
education, and religion “so much so that by 1900 the Africans considered them to be a separate 
group.”21 Indeed, this relationship between Senegalese and French elites is  not new. Senegalese 
institutions have been simply a continuity of colonial France, including all of its governing 
systems like the constitution, presidential system, judiciary, National Assembly, law 
enforcement, and military. Informally, President Senghor, President Diouf and President Sall 
have championed the Francophonie. Although the official state language, French is used only by 
15-20% of the population, even as it is the language of governmental administration, effectively 
cutting out the majority of the country’s population from effective participation in governments.  
The developmental consequences of these formal and informal continuities with France 
have been severe. To take one example of the underperformance of the postcolonial government, 
Senegal has not met all of the millennium development goals22 nor the sustainable development 
goals.23 At a deeper level, fundamental state building processes have been neglected by France 
and the elites in Senegal, including the development of a cohesive national identity. Where the 
                                                 
21Curtin, Philip D. Africa & the West: Intellectual Responses to European Culture. University of 
Wisconsin Press 1974: 144.  
22The official United Nations site for the MDG Indicators. (2015). Millennium Development 
Goals Indicators: Retrieved from 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2015/Snapshots/SEN.pdf 
23Africa SDG INDEX AND DASHBOARDS REPORT. (2018). Retrieved from 
http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/AFRICA-SDGS-2018-Complete-Report-
WEB.pdf 
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literature shows that many successful Asian developmental states have had high-levels of state 
unity and political unity, Senegal is frequently divided along linguistic and ethnic lines – 
divisions that are often historical and reproduced through elite politics. For example, French 
civilizing values and Islamic values are often at odds and, more importantly, enable the 
reproduction of multiple different elite classes, including ethnic elites, marabout Islamic elites, 
and French elites and their associated Signares (metis) elites. In sum, because of long-running 
connections between French elites and Senegalese elites – relationships that rested on historical 
patterns of colonial rule – Senegal has had a divided political system that has made it difficult to 
do national political planning, has wedded the Senegalese economy to France, and has prevented 
the broad-based distribution of the country’s wealth to average citizens. 
In the following sections, readers will learn how Senegal’s politics have been inherited and 
maintained by an elitist class with strong links to France, and their role in the underdevelopment 
of Senegal. First, starting with a short background information on the pre-colonial, then colonial 
period through the post-modern era, and highlighting the importance of unification, and why 
Senegal has not been effectively unified. Second, an empirical investigation on French’s divide 
and rule within the institutions, including the French civilizing mission impacts in the politics and 
economy of Senegal. Finally, the readers will be able to understand the impact of the 
synchronization of traditionalism and Sufism countering French domination, but also the political 
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Chapter 4 
4.1 Pre-Colonial Senegal 
Pre-colonial Senegal included historical links with modern day neighboring countries: 
Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea were marked by trans-Saharan slave trade 
issues, and rulership accession conflicts. After the decline of the Wagadu (Ghana Empire) and 
Mali Empires, the kingdoms in Senegal consisted of Sine-Saloum, Walo (Oualo), Jolof (Djolof 
or Diolof), Cayor (Kajoor), Boal (Bawol) located in north-east. Kaabu in the south and Takrur 
(Tekrur or Tekrour), Denianke (Great Fulo) and later Imamate of Fouta Toro (Futanke Empire) 
in the north-West. Walo, which once held Jolof, and Sine-Saloum in a confederacy, was 
governed by a matrilineal accession of kings, elected through a system of lamame, the council of 
elders. Concerning the people of Senegal, it has been a crossroad of ethnic groups, and each 
ethnic group could trace its lineage to one of the kingdoms. Relationships through marriages 
formed the alliances within the kingdoms.  
Understanding these precolonial political patterns is important because it continues to 
impact the ethnic and social makeup of postcolonial Senegal. For instance, although the actual 
ethnic groups within Senegal accounted for at least fifty ethnic groups, usually with sub-groups 
related to a major group, since 1971, Wolof, Sereer, Pulaar (Fulani), Jola, Malinke and Soninke 
were recognized as national languages by Presidential decree – languages that had their roots in 
precolonial kingdoms.24 The dominant religious practice was ancestral spirit religion, and Islam 
was introduced in the region in the 10th- through 11th  centuries with the Takrur King, War Jabi Ibn 
                                                 
24République du Sénégal: http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/afrique/senegal.htm; Décret n° 71-566 
du 21 mai 1971 
relatif à la transcription des langues nationales: http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/afrique/senegal-
decret1971.htm 
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Rabis Ndiaye’s conversion in 1030, but the Wolof, Serere, Soninke, Fulani, and Mandinka rejected 
the orthodox Islam that called for total abandonment of African traditional religion. Later Islamic 
Sufism, the dominant religion in Senegal today, was practiced in Moors Emirate of Trarza 
(Mauritania), and in Futanke Imamate of Futa Toro,25 located on the Northern part of Senegal.26 
Islamic Sufism coexisted with the traditional religion,27 and the presence of the Kounta marabout 
Quranic teachers of Sufi Qadiriyya of Algeria, and Qadiriyya Clerics Moors of 
Mauritania/Morocco facilitated the spread of Islam within Cayor in 1800.28 Gradually, Islamic 
Sufi orders absorbed the traditional ruling class through marriages between members within the 
royal nobility and Islamic clerics’ households. 
These religious patterns had political effects. For example, the “advantages of literacy in 
Arabic meant that Muslim scholar-clerics were maintained in royal courts within the states, 
regardless of the religion of the ruler himself”29 and the title as a Muslim was a marker of status 
(pilgrimage to Mecca and literacy were a source of great prestige).30 As mentioned, Sufi Qadiriyya 
facilitated Islam in the region; the Sufi order (tariqa) founder was the Persian, Abdul Qadir 
Gilani (1077–1166). In Senegal, this Qadiriyya tariqa was tolerant as it incorporated or 
synchronized some forms of African traditions. The reformist Sufi order Qadiriyya, Tidianïa 
(Tijani), was founded by the Algerian Berber (Moor), Ahmad al-Tijani (1737–1815); however, 
                                                 
25Salm Steven J.,  Falola Toyin. African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective (Rochester 
Studies in African History and the Diaspora). University of Rochester Press 2005: 247. 
26M'bayo, Tamba. Muslim Interpreters in Colonial Senegal, 1850–1920: Mediations of 
Knowledge and Power in the Lower and Middle Senegal River Valley. Lexington Books 2016: 
viii-ix 
27Gaudio, Attilio Les populations du Sahara occidental: histoire, vie et culture. Karthala 1993. 
28Glover, John. Sufism and Jihad in Modern Senegal: The Murid Order. University of Rochester 
Press 2007. 
29Villalón, Leonardo A. Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in 
Fatick.  Cambridge University Press 2009: 61. 
30Kane Ousmane Oumar. Beyond Timbuktu. Harvard University Press 2016. 
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starting in the 1660s, marked the era of the rise of marabout Sufi Islamic clerics31 and late 1770s, 
marked the era of the Futanke’s Torodo Revolution led by the Almamy of Fouta Thierno 
Souleymane Baal and Abdul Kader Kane. In addition, the late 1840s until 1890s, marked the era 
of civil war between the Fouta Toro32 Futanke, the Massina Fulbe, and the Kounta (Kunta) 
- Peul Qadrïa, caused by the Tidianïa (Tijani or Tijaniyya) Futanke, El Hadj Umar Tall33 and 
Fulani’s jihadism against non-Muslim aristocracy.34  
Beginning in the late fifteenth century through the seventeenth century, Portuguese35 and 
Dutch36 were the first Europeans that conducted trade in Senegal’s coastal port of Goree Island. 
The first metis (Signares) population regulating the commercial trade, were descendants of Lebu 
and Portuguese.37 However, trading between France and Senegal started in 1628, with the Trarza 
                                                 
31Curtin Philip D. “Jihad in West Africa: Early Phases and Inter-Relations in Mauritania and 
Senegal.” Cambridge University Press The Journal of African History Vol. 12, No. 1 (1971): 11-
24  
32But West Africa, the Senegambia in particular, was having its own revolution: a Muslim 
theocratic revolution……In both Haiti and West Africa these revolutions were of course related 
to the slave trade. This statement was retrieved from: Miller, Chris. The French Atlantic 
Triangle. Literature and Culture of the Slave Trade. Duke University Press Books 2008: 260. 
33Bruijn Mirjam De. Rethinking Resistance: 63. 
34Bruijn, Mirjam De and Dijk, Han Van. Peuls et Mandingues: dialectiques des constructions 
identitaires. Afrika-Studiecentrum 1997: 40; Marty, Paul. Études sur l'Islam et les tribus du 
Soudan: La région de Tombouctou (Islam songaï) Dienné, le Macina et dé-pendances (Islam 
peul). E. Leroux, 1920: 193; Bruijn Mirjam De, Abbink Gerrit Jan and Walraven Klaas Van. 
Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History. Brill 2003:63-65. 
35M'Leod, Alexander and Phillips, Ulrich Bonnell. American Negro Slavery: A Survey of the 
Supply, Employment, and Control of Negro Labor as Determined by the Plantation Regime.  
Louisiana State University Press 1966: 12. 
36Barry, Boubacar. Senegambia and the Atlantic slave trade (African Studies). Cambridge 
University Press 1997: 47.  
37Islam was less important on Gorée Island, where the small free black population seems to have 
been a mixture of Muslims, Christians, and believers in traditional religions. Many of them were 
originally Afro-Portuguese, descendants of Portuguese traders who settled along the coast during 
the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and clung to their Catholic identity. As in Saint-Louis, 
this habitant population played a major role in commerce. On the Petite Cote, the area south of 
Cape Verde, and the various estuaries that marked the coast from the Saalum River, just north of 
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raiders (razzias) of Walo “supplying slaves to the Saharan trade, the Portuguese, and the French;”38 
additionally, marking the era of the ‘gun-slave cycle’ trade between African rulers and European 
merchants.39 The Muslim emirs in Trarza, Brackna and Fouta Toro collected tolls and taxes from 
the French merchants and metis, especially, Fouta Toro oligarchy controlled the water route from 
Saint Louis into the interior.  
By the 1850s, the Lebu Islamic Sufi community within Cayor would play a crucial role in 
the relation between France and Senegal. Certain Lebu members, integrated in the French colonial 
army, and participated in the conquest of Boal, Sine, and Saloum,40 In fact, Lebu had political 
autonomy from Cayor, but France extended its dominion by annexing the Lebu’s land of Goree 
Island, Dakar and Rufisque, by making them French communes. Given the status of the Lebu as 
the original inhabitants of the French communes, the Lebu’s language Wolof has been rapidly 
becoming the lingua franca of Senegal. The metis were accustomed in Wolof culture. Yet despite 
having Wolof as their main language, the assimilation into French culture, availed metis to gain 
privileges and it was without France’s application of politique de races (1818-1920), which was 
instrumental in limiting social mobility by race and ethnic grouping. Metis and their counterparts’ 
Black Frenchmen regarded France as the solution for guiding Senegal’s development. 
                                                 
the Gambia, to Sierra Leone, they traded with Muslim Juula traders from interior areas and with 
Afro-Portuguese middleman communities scattered along the coast. This statement was retrieved 
from: Klein, Martin A. “Slaves, Gum, and Peanuts: Adaptation to the End of the Slave Trade in 
Senegal, 1817-48.” Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture: The William 
and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 66, No. 4, Abolishing the Slave Trades: Ironies and 
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38Getz, Trevor R. Slavery and Reform in West Africa Toward Emancipation in Nineteenth-
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39Lovejoy, Paul E and Lovejoy, Paul Ellsworth. Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery 
in Africa. Cambridge University Press 2000: 110. 
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4.2 Colonial Senegal 
 Senegal’s colonial chapter built the basis for Senegal and France’s multi-faceted 
relationship – a relationship built as much on interpersonal relationships as through physical 
domination. As Hillary Jones writes of the colonial encounter, “The expansion of French rule in 
Senegal operated as much through the private sphere of marriage and family as it did through 
military force.”41 this relationship impacted the social, cultural, political and economic structure 
of Senegal. From the colonial period until present, Senegal’s politics and economy remained 
under France’ sphere of influence, as France replaced preexisting state structures by 
implementing policies that benefited certain groups or classes within the society. Despite the 
ongoing relations between the two countries, the two crucial advantages of development, capital 
and technology that France possessed over Senegal in the colonial era remained unchanged 
today. Although politics have reformed to a certain extent as time progresses, why has the 
French economic exploitation of Senegal persisted? The justification isn’t complex, simply in the 
case of Senegal, the institutions and its elites’ relationship with France enabled the continuation 
of Senegal’s under-development.  
French monopolization of the coastal port of Goree Island came about through wars 
against the Portuguese and the Dutch.42 Additionally, France solidified its presence at the 
uninhabited portion between Walo and Cayor called Ndar in 1638 and, by 1659, French General 
Thomas Lambert baptized Ndar at Saint-Louis (tribute to King Louis IX and King Louis 
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XIV).4344 Several French policies of assimilation, such as King Louis XIV’s Le Code Noir (The 
Black Code) decree of assimilation, governed the lives of the subjects in the settlement and 
authorized the marriage between the Signares and Frenchmen.45 In spite of France’s decree of 16 
Pluviose Year I & II (1792 and 1794) abolition of slavery and declaration that “all men without 
distinction of colour residing in the colonies, are French citizens,”46 the period of direct rule 
established by Napoleonic Code, redefined the lives of the metis, regulated marriages and 
reintroduced the slave trade, as it was the only profitable commerce for French merchants and 
metis.4748 As a consequence of this revived slave trade, Saint Louis traders sold “ammunition, 
tobacco, and other valued goods.”49 In return, clerics and chiefs sold slaves, ivory, and gold dust. 
Yet even as the French were trying to expand their commercial dealings in Senegal, the 
British occupation of Goree Island and Saint Louis for 30 years (1693, 1758-63, 1779-83, 1800-
17)50 hampered France’s economy in Senegal. Together with the implementation of British Slave 
Trade Act of 1807 and the Congress of Vienna’s universal abolition of slavery, “Senegal was of 
limited value to France, but a vibrant community of Euro-african and African Muslim merchants, 
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45Bailey, Alexander. Architecture and Urbanism in the French Atlantic Empire: State, Church, 
and Society, 1604-1830 (McGill-Queen's French Atlantic Worlds Series). McGill-Queen's 
University Press 2018: 98. 
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sailors, and skilled workers ensured its future.”51 France’s reconquest and negotiation of Goree 
Island and Saint Louis in 1817, marked a renewal era of imposing Western values under mission 
civilatrice. For example, the Catholic missionaries, Freres de Ploërmel and Soeurs de Saint-Joseph 
de Cluny, educated the children of the European elite and the metis bourgeoisie.52 Although, the 
Catholic missionary, conflicted with the colonial administration’s rule, African traditions, and 
opposed the metis marriage a la mode,53 Governor Blanchot54 and General Faidherbe55 practiced 
metis marriage a la mode and legitimized their metis children.56  
These family lineages would have long-run consequences for Senegal’s economy, as the 
metis families and French merchant dominated the politics within the communes. Despite their 
commercial and political power, this was problematic for France colonial army and their financial 
backers.57 Eventually, France’s colonial administration dismantled the metis’ political grip, by 
creating oversight institutions designed for the slaves, local aristocracy and Muslim. Slavery was 
the engine of the French economy. 58 On the upper north of Saint Louis59 (Richard Toll and 
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Dagana), the French implemented, engages a temps, a system of indentured laborers similar to the 
slave trade, 60 but practiced domestically.61 This economic slave-based system remained in this 
form of engages a temps with modifications throughout the French occupation until Senegal’s 
independence. 
What other resources did Senegal have that were of interest to France? Klein listed three 
resources: slaves, gum, and peanuts. Walo possessed the majority of the lucrative high quality, 
gum that was used in various manufacture industries in Europe, such as cooking, medicine and 
textiles process.62 The local traders or traintants/négociants metis and France commercial 
companies based in Bordeaux, benefited from the gum trade. In depth information detailing the 
economic and political conflict concerning the Senegalese gum, was provided by Great Britain 
Foreign Office,63 while Diouf64 and Eltis65 distinguished between the trade of major sources, 
France extracted for export, and in return, French firms “sold sugar, flour, beer, wine, textiles and 
not-without grave effects on local warfare.”66 Besides the gum trade, France attempted cotton 
production, but the potential of the peanut was more valuable.67 By the mid-1860s, peanuts’ export 
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“value of approximately $1.25 million” exceeded the “annual revenues derived from selling slaves 
in the second half of the eighteenth century.”68 Purely profitable to the French, “Senegal accounted 
for more than four-fifths of the total exports of the colonial Federation of French West Africa.”69 
However, despite its profitability during the colonial era, the peanut industry caused long-term 
political and social problems following independence and particularly from 1960-1970, as reliance 
on one crop made postcolonial farmers very susceptible to market fluctuations. 
France’s Second Republic, implemented political reforms during the inception of the 
peanut production. However, the Islamic jihad wars led by EL Hadj Umar Tall, and his disciples, 
created a hostile atmosphere for the French, Christians and traditionalists. France and Islam came 
to terms in the communes, as the “first of the Islamic courts in the four communes was opened in 
St. Louis in 1848, and Africans who became French citizens could still be subjected to the 
jurisdiction of Islamic courts.”70 At this time, the Metis (Signares) participated in French elections, 
in which they “elected a deputy to the national assembly in Paris.”71 The metis family, Valantin, 
dominated the gum trade, as well as politics. Barthelemy Durand Valantin served as the metis 
mayor of Saint Louis and the first Senegalese deputy at France’s National Assembly. The author 
Hillary Jones noted, the General Council in Senegal was the metis’ “field of engagement with 
French officials, sometimes facilitating the consolidation of French rule but at other times 
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contesting colonial practice.”72 Economically, the metis were devasted having lost the gum trade 
competition by French merchants of Marseilles, as well the Bordeaux companies. Throughout the 
economic hardships, metis remained resilient and the advantage they took on educational 
opportunities have served them well in economic and politics, enabling political and economic 
power long after colonialism ended. 
By the 1850s until 1880s, the competing forces, France and Fouta Toro Futanke’s 
hegemonic expansion, destabilized the traditional states. France’ sphere of influence was the 
communes, and the Futanke’s sphere of influence was Fouta Toro.73 France had a Westernizing 
“civilizing mission” and Futanke had an “Orthodox Islamization mission,” and Senegal was 
trapped within these two camps. Yet, despite their rivalry, there were moments of cooperation 
between the French and Futanke. For example, France sold arms to the Futanke with the aim of 
using them to conquer the interior.74 The appointment of General Faidherbe, as Governor of Saint 
Louis was crucial to enabling this change. It also proved effective. By 1854, the process of 
conquest in the interior of Senegal began as a process of colonisation en douceur, a friendly 
approach to diplomacy, involving pacification, and appeasement.75 General Faidherbe exploited 
France’s relationship with the metis, the Saint Louis Muslims, the Lebu, and the Wolof. Once he 
created Tirailleurs Sénégalais, the first black military regiments, engages a temps was used for 
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recruitment, but the metis, the Lebu, the Wolof76 and the Saint Louis Muslims conscripted to 
prominent ranks in the colonial army and participated in the conquest of Senegal.  
Second, Faidherbe’s consolidation of Islamic courts was welcomed by the Muslim 
habitants of the Qadiriyya order. Prior to the conquest of Senegal, Faidherbe developed an 
understanding of Arabo-Berber culture and Islam during his service in Algeria. By applying the 
Algerian Islamic model, Faidherbe appointed Prominent Saint Louis Muslims, Tamsir Hamet 
Ndiaye and Dudu Seck (Bu El Mogdad), as interpreters and judges (Cadi or Kadi) of the Muslim 
tribunals within the communes.77 Additionally, France started financing the Bu El Mogdad’s hadj 
pilgrimages to Mecca.78 These Bu El Mogdad received French education in Saint Louis79 and 
studied under Islamic clerics’ zawiya (universities) in Mauritania. France and Mauritania 
Qadiriyya clerics maintained good relations with Saint Louis inhabitants.80 After the Bu El 
Mogdad died, France replaced them with their sons to preserve cooperation. The Muslim 
interpreters were effective in pacifying the clerics and the chiefs in the interior, and in return, it 
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provided a line of communication and power sharing with France. Yet, even as such alliances were 
crucial for France’s ability to rule Senegal, its advanced weapons were superior to the weaponry 
possessed by local Senegalese forces, which enabled military conquest. 
Conquering and governing are not the same thing, though. And, in Senegal, General 
Faidherb was responsible for erecting the majority of the colony’s current institutions. This 
included, the establishment of the first primary and secondary education systems and urban 
infrastructures.  After defeating Walo,81 Faidherbe established École des Otages and granted 
Walo a dual language French and Wolof constitution in 185982 and ratified in 1871.83 Integrating 
Senegalese aristocracy as agents of France involved pacification, and École des Otages, was a 
selective institution that groomed and educated the sons of chiefs, as interpreters, and future 
leaders.84 France implemented the politics of association, to facilitate entente and cooperation 
between rulers and ruled. The graduates of École des Otages, Yero Booli Jaawo (Yoro Boly 
Diaw), and his brother and son Fara Penda from the Djolof aristocracy, were placed in the newly 
created administrative position such as Chef de Canton. The other graduates of École des Otages, 
Walo’s Prince Siddiya Joop (1871-1878),8586 king of Djolof Bourba Alboury N’Diaye (1875-
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1895) and his son Mansour Alboury N’Diaye (1895-1921) were enthroned in their respective 
kingdoms. A key point often not highlighted was that France spent time studying Senegal before 
engagement; Yero Booli Jaawo, the pioneer of Senegal history, compiled works regarding the 
Senegalese kingdoms’ system of government, customs and the process for the accession of the 
king. From these works of Jaawo, France devised its policies of pacification and rapprochement.  
French colonial governor retained the right of the enthronement of the kings in Walo and 
Djolof, taken into account the custom practice. France declared king of Djolof Bourba Alboury 
N’Diaye as an enemy, and unenthroned Prince Siddiya for failing to collect taxes, but this 
collection of taxes, a problem of the colonial era, also has persisted in the post-colonial era. The 
collection of taxes outside of the communes was challenging because in certain areas of the 
interior France placed Chefs de cantons that did not speak the same language as the locals, and 
the locals refused to pay taxes. All the power that the local aristocracy once possessed were 
stripped away, albeit the rightful rulers, received salary from France based on the amount of 
taxes they collected. Jaawo, the first chef de canton of Walo couldn’t implement political or 
economic decisions without the authorization of a French chef superieur.87 French rule in Walo 
allowed only limited social and cultural autonomy, although no economic freedom. 
Groundnut production fueled by France’s oil and soap industries, became the precursor of 
France’s expansion in the interior of Senegal. However, the Islamic reformist Tijaniyya, created 
an opportunity for France to expand in the interior. During Faidherb’s governorship of Senegal, 
                                                 
87Sall Ibrahima Abou. Mauritanie du sud conquêtes et administration coloniales françaises, 
1890-1945. Karthala 2007: 18-190 
    Senegal’s unsustainable economic growth by Amadou Konteye 
 28 
Futanke deposed the Malinke in Kaabu88 and the Futanke leader, Mamba Diakhou Bâ’s jihad89  
against the Wollof, Serer, Jola and Mandinka, and annexation of Saloum, weakened the traditional 
states. When Mamba Diakhou Bâ was killed in Sine,90 in return, France assassinated the 
traditionalist Sine’s King Maada Ndoffene Famak Joof. Consequently, the French expansion in 
the region coincided with the Futanke territorial expansion.91 Despite the Tijaniyya uprising, the 
Fulbe-Futanke Tijaniyya controlled several states in the interior. Haalpular and Islam, served as 
their identity, and they established educational institutions by promoting “Islam more actively and 
placed particular emphasis on Islamic education as a stabilizing social force. ... and religious 
leadership.”92 France signed a protectorate treaty with Fouta Toro in 1863, but it couldn’t contain 
the jihad until in the 1890s. The lasting legacy, except the Layene Islamic confrere, all other 
Islamic confrere founders’ ancestors originated from Fouta Toro, but it still remained as a region 
of traditional religious education, migration, and poverty. 
In Cayor, General Faidherbe and his successors, applied colonisation en douceur,93 a 
process involving appeasement to counter the damels Birima Ngone Latyr Fall, Macodou 
Coumba Yande Mbarrou, and Lat Dior Ngone Latyr Diop’s refusal of the railroad construction 
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project.94 The following elite sympathizers, Madiodio Deguen Fall (1861/1863-1865) and Samba 
Yaya Fall (1882-1883) were enthroned by France.95  The last damel of Cayor, Samba Laobé Fall 
(Lat Dior nephew), was enthroned by France in 1883. He served as a mediator between the 
peanut farmers and the colonial administration, and also fought against France. Furthermore, Lat 
Dior, France’s ennemi héréditaire96 and a Thiedo/Ceddo (non-Muslim), that converted to Islam 
in 1861, formed an alliance with France against El Hadj Umar Tall’ son, Ahmadu Ibn Umar Tall 
in 1875.  This alliance was based on mutual interest, France feared that a federation of Islamic 
states could have a detrimental effect on its economic interest in Senegal, while Lat Dior wanted 
to regain control of his kingdom. On the other hand, Demba Waar Sall, Lat Dior former general, 
plotted with France, and Lat Dior was killed in 1886. Additionally, France assassinated Samba 
Laobé Fall the same year, and appointed Demba War Sall, as President of Confederation of 
Chiefs (1886-1901). The enthronement of elite sympathizers became France’ strategy in securing 
economic interest, and it was without political assassination of dissidents. 
Inasmuch as France abolished the damels governing system, it marked the end of the 
politics between the traditional kings and France. The only exception, France signed a protectorate 
treaty with the kings of Sine and Saloum in 1888, and placed Chef-lieu Foundiougne to serve as a 
liaison. Walo, Cayor, Baol, and Djolof under France’s control became the peanut basin (1885-
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1915) and the lives of the subjects, governed by France’s régime de l'indigénat (Code de 
l'indigénat 1887-1947).97  
In sum, the territorial conquest involved tenuous alliances and tenuous treaties, yet the 
divergent elites established institutions to promote their agenda. France eliminated the dissidents 
and placed Senegalese elites in its established institutions as long they support France’s economic 
interest. The fact these colonial Senegalese elites were limited to social and cultural, the same 
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Chapter 5 
5.1 Political Transition 
France planned Senegal’s political transition prior to independence, and political power 
was transferred from the French administrators to the metis and then to the Black Frenchmen. The 
participation of Senegal in French elections (1848-1956), Parliamentary elections (1879-1959), 
and Referendums (1945-1958), set Senegal apart from the rest of the Francophone countries in 
Africa. Next, Senegal was the administrative home for the Governor General of Afrique 
Occidentale Française (A.O.F) also known as French West Africa (1895-1957). Senegal was 
governed by Governors of Senegal based in Saint Louis under the command of the Governor 
General based in Senegal’s current capital, Dakar, the capital of A.O.F (1907-1958). Furthermore, 
Senegal was also the administrative home for the High Commissioner (1957-1958). These periods 
weren’t different than the colonial era, in which France experimented with different institutions, 
and implemented different policies in order to safeguard its economic interest. France kept Senegal 
separated by limiting political, economic and educational opportunities to certain groups. For 
example, the originaire of the communes had one governing system while the indigène of the 
interior had a separate governing system. Despite the political reforms, France micromanaged 
Senegal and has continued to do so through the elites’ cooperation. 
The French’s institutional design with its systematic divisions were first challenged by 
the metis or Originaires - Africans born in the French communes. The metis families, Deves and 
Crespin used the newspapers, Le Réveil du Sénégal (1885) and Le Petit Sénégalais (1886)98 to 
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voice political and economic issues.99 The turning point of metis’ politics by the year 1897, 
started with metis’ demonstration that called for reforms of the regime’ status quo and 
proclaimed ‘Senegal for Senegalese.’ France compromised with the metis as it feared the 
originaires’ connection within the interior could destabilize its economic interests. The French 
settlers and metis formed a partnership in the quasi-legislative Counsel. The metis presented their 
candidacy for the National Assembly, galvanizing support from the Muslim and the Black 
Frenchmen habitants of the four communes that made up 90 to 95 percent of the votes. Despite 
the civic duty of voting, Senegal remained divided. Particularly in the interior, the subjects could 
not vote, and the difficult process of becoming a citizen, was perpetrated by the French officials. 
Regardless of the loyalty of Senegalese toward France, equality was systematically limited, and 
the policies created insular classes that focused on their economic interest rather than the interest 
of the state. Overall, competition between the groups and France’s divide and rule strategy 
impacted Senegal’s development. 
Wealth and political connection defined the two status of elites in Senegal. Metis families 
like the Deves, Crespin, Carpot, D’Emeville, Guillabert, and Descemet weren’t just politicians, 
they held positions such as administrators, merchants, mayors, lawyers, and businessmen that 
maintained commercial networks within the communes and in the interior. More importantly, the 
advantage of the “electoral institutions afforded the métis the ability to develop a degree of 
autonomy from Bordeaux commerce.”100 The metis’ firms were based on the Bordeaux model, 
and collection of taxes was not an issue for originaires, and Muslim habitants of the four 
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communes. Their contribution was put toward urban development, and France made the 
Senegalese pay for the development, but the metis had an advantage largely due to their investment 
and access in the metropole.  
Additionally, marriage impacted the field of electoral politics. Metis practiced the 
Crespin/Deves dynastic model of marriage, which was a marriage amongst elites to preserve 
wealth within the families. Similar to the metis’ economic status, the Black Frenchmen, 
originaires or Évolués101 (African in A.O.F with some level of education, graduate of William 
Ponty of Senegal, and higher status than indigènes), a great member of the them came from well-
known noble families that have economic and political relations with the metis and France. For 
example, Galandou Diouf’s family supported French expansion, Blaise Diagne was adopted by 
the metis family Crespin, Leopold Sedar Senghor’s father was adopted by Adrien Mourlan, a 
French businessman102 and Amadou Lamine Gueye’s came from noble merchant family of Saint 
Louis. The prominent metis and Black Frenchmen were also members of the Freemason,103 an 
exclusive elitist club that inducted all four Senegalese Presidents.    
France’s history reminded us that every group must struggle in order to secure its interest 
and the metis fought for the rights of the originaires. Carpot’s two terms (1902 & 1914) were 
crucial in advocating for equal rights, and the metis Governor General, William Ponty (1908-
1915) argued "Senegalese deserved keeping their rights because of their long and loyal 
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devotion to France.”104 Although Ponty improved the Code de l'indigénat,105 in some ways, it 
was insignificant bringing full structural reforms because of the racial implications, which 
retained some form of white superiority. On the other hand, the metis mayor Deves led the 
movement to desegregate the school system, advocated for secular education and provision of 
social services for the communes.106  On the positive note, the metis and the Catholic missionary 
participated in the cultural cultivation and education of the Black Frenchmen (see 
Mamigonian107, Bryant108 and Djoloftv Sénégal109). Black Frenchmen and metis were fervent 
patriots of France and their education, military service and wealth enabled them to push for 
structural reforms. One of the elites’ schools, Ecole Normale (Ecole William Ponty), a selective 
institution,110 was instrumental in the education of the African statesmen that ruled the post-
colonial states.111 Overall, France’s universal education design, functioned only theoretically, as 
it only reproduced an elitist minority. Politics was tied to Senegal’s economy and the metis 
oligarchic model persisted, as today’s regime in power, only concerned with protecting their self-
interest. These societal cleavages have permeated in political parties, as well in religious group. 
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Correspondingly, political transition occurred in the Islamic institution. The Moors that 
once dominated the Kunta Quadria orders were replaced by four indigenous Islamic confreres 
such as the Sufi Layene of the Lebu based in the French communes, generated wealth from being 
fishermen. Next, the two Futanke Tijaniyya confreres of El Hadj Umar Tall’s disciples: Sy based 
in Baol, Tivaoune, and Niass based in Saloum, specialized in herdsmen and farming. Finally, the 
Sufi Mouride with mass Wolof and later Serere converts based in Baol and Saloum, specialized 
in agriculture. The clerics became powerful in the interior, as the number of converts increased; 
Muslim clerics married into the households of the local aristocracy to increase political power 
and fortunes.  The Sufi clerics guided the Muslim population, and the followers give the clerics 
hadiya money or other donations instead of paying taxes to the government.  
Islamic jihadism was not fully quelled down, and the French’s fear of Muslim uprising 
lingered. Consequently, some chefs de cantons, instigated fear of Islamic revolts, and France 
acted by jailing or exiling the clerics in order to suppress the Islamic movements of the Leyene 
of Seydina Limamou Laye (1856-1919), and the Mouride of Ahmadou Bamba (1889-1927). 
France was obligated to take drastic measures of dealing with the Senegalese Muslims in the 
interior. However, the election of 1902 was a turning point between metis and the indigenous 
Sufi confreres. France exiled Ahmadou Bamba in Gabon (1895-1902) and in Mauritania (1903-
1907), but his disciples used their money earned from cultivating peanut to finance the campaign 
of the metis lawyer candidate, Francois Carpot.  Once in office, Carpot negotiated Bamba’s 
return,112 and since produced the peaceful cohabitation of politics and religion enjoyed by 
Senegalese. Differentiated from France Laïcité (secularism), the religious groups in Senegal have 
continued to play an important role in politic, economic, as well in the stability of the country. 
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Diplomacy amongst the elites reversed the hostilities toward French rule, but 
economically, France benefited while Senegal’s gains from such partnership remained 
questionable. France needed the labor force of the Sufi clerics for peanut production. The two 
French administrators, Xavier Coppolani and Paul Marty, established the foundation of the social 
contract between France and the Senegalese Muslim (French Muslim policy).113 In 
consolidation, France accepted the clerics to practice their religion without constraints, granted 
El Hadj Malick Sy to establish Tijani zdwiya (Islamic university) in Tivaouane, and authorized 
the Mouride (Murid) to experiment with Marty’s ideas of daara, Murid villages based on 
agriculture and Islamic education,114 in which parents sent their sons to live, study, and work 
with a marabout.115 Despite what the French labeled the daara, which consisted of “rote 
instruction, poor level of scholarship,”116 it was an alternative educational institution from the 
selective French schools. Additionally, France financed mosque building projects and continued 
the tradition of secretly funding “loyal religious leaders and provided logistical support for the 
organization of the pilgrimage to Mecca.”117 In return, Sy118 and Bamba119 commended the 
disciples to respect the cohabitation of French rule and pay taxes. Above all, France exploited the 
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Mouride’s main principle of ndiggel, a command given to the followers by the Cheikh. The 
ndiggel required strong work ethic in agriculture. Under the French, this ndiggel served as a 
political tool,120 as well for the recruitment of soldiers during the Great Wars.  
France supported the Mouride’s expansion in the interior, granted them vast tracts of 
lands, and applied the systematic investment plan (SIP) for the migration of peasant cultivators 
in the new lands.121 The currency of exchange was the French Francs until the year 1945, and the 
Mouride “followers became rich by growing groundnuts and the French benefited 
by taxing groundnut exports,”122 but the exploitation of the Mouride labor by France economic 
interest lasted for decades. The farmers did not counter France’s exploitation, and the reason 
could be France’s contribution toward the (hadj) trip to Mecca for its loyal Senegalese Muslim 
clerics, or it could be the Islamic principle about the after-life rewards, prioritized above the 
actual exploitive condition.  The followers of the Sufi orders dedicated their life to their 
confreres and gave the majority of their hard-earned profit to their spiritual cheikhs, marabouts, 
Khalifas, or clerics in exchange for divine intervention and promise of entering heaven. Most 
importantly, the normalization of relations between France and the Islamic spiritual leaders such 
as Ahmadou Bamba, El Hadji Malick Sy, Seydina Issa Laye, El Hadji Seydou Nourou Tall, and 
El Hadji Ibrahima Niasse, led to the synchronization of Sufism into Senegal’s politic.123 At 
present, the land that France granted to Mouride, the holy city124 of Touba (Mecca of West 
Africa); a state within a state, Touba has continued to operate its own governmental 
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institutions.125 The leadership of the Senegalese Sufi orders, continued to be a family rule, 
whereas power only passes through the founders’ family. 
Equally important, the Black Frenchmen, the originaires or Évolués held the same career 
professions as metis and shared similar political struggles. The first African political group, 
L'Aurore de Saint-Louis (1908), club of Évolués made up of a voluntary association of young 
city-dwellers, participated in the local electoral process;126 the metis Deves ran with Galandou 
Diouf based on the mutual interest against French settlers and commercial interests. This General 
Council elections of 1909, marked the political rise of the Black Frenchmen. However, loyalty to 
France guaranteed more political rights. As a municipal representative, Diouf served as a 
lieutenant in the French army during WWI and was one of the founding members of political 
Parti- Jeunes Sénégalais (Young Senegalese 1912) along with its editorial, La democratie du 
Senegal. The Young Senegalese included clerks, school teachers, interpreters, and letter-writers, 
which was an elitist pressure group that lobbied for labor rights, extension of political 
participation, and scholarship educational rights in France. 
L'Aurore de St-Louis and Jeunes Sénégalais were the precursors of Senegal’s political 
parties,127 that paved the way for the nomination of a former custom and duty officer,128 Blaise 
Diagne, elected as the first Black deputy in the General Council elections of 1914. However, the 
election brought friction between the metis and the Black Frenchmen. Many metis that wanted to 
retain power, voted against Diagne, but Carpot and other metis including Deves and Crespin 
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supported their Freemason partner, Diagne. Interestingly, Senegalese Catholics and Muslim 
weren’t restricted to biased voting. These Senegalese elites were well connected amongst 
themselves and with France elites (see Hosea Jaffe’s Senegal: From Diagne to Senghor).129 
Diagne and his political advisor Galandou, challenged the French administration’s limitation of 
originaires’ political rights, advocated for Lebu’s land rights, and France citizenship rights. 
Loyalty to France was solidified as Diagne recruited African soldiers to fight for France in WWI 
(1914-1918) and negotiated citizenship rights for the four communes privileged blacks, in which 
France approved as the Loi Blaise Diagne in 1916, and in “1919 Diagne founded the Republican 
Socialist Party, the first Western-style sub-Saharan African political party, which soon 
dominated Senegalese politic.”130 Eventually, the political fallout between Diagne and his 
political advisor Galandou over French interest,131 set a precedent for the future Senegalese 
political elites’ factions.  
Franco-Senegal’s colonial legacy has been sustained through the elites’ relationship, 
consolidated by a long tradition of marriages. The majority of these first and second generations 
Black Frenchmen political elites, as well the third generation such as Abdou Diouf and Habib 
Thiam, practiced the metis’ marriage a la mode, in which they married French women or 
metis.132 From Diagne’ statement “I am black, my wife is white, and my children are mixed”133 
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to the first President of Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor’s remarks, «Je demeure plus que jamais 
convaincu que le metissage culture est un ideal de civilization»134  (the melting pot of France and 
Senegal cultures to be an ideal civilization). In addition, the second President of Senegal, Abdou 
Diouf requoted Senghor «C'est en français que s'incarnent notre identité, notre mémoire et notre 
avenir. C'est également en français que s'expriment notre fierté, notre solidarité et notre 
modernité »135  (it is in French that the Senegalese Black Frenchmen incarnated His identity and 
future). 
Senegalese devoted a great time in political struggles against France, but France’s 
economic development (1815-1914)136 and economic growth (1974-2014)137 indicated France 
had a slow industrial development. Therefore, France couldn’t do much to assist Senegal in 
developing, because at the same time, France was pondering over Etinne Richet’s Le probleme 
colonial (1919) and George Hardy’s 1921 dissertation, La Mise en valeur du Senegal de 1817 a 
1854.138 France has continued benefiting from Senegal’s resources. By the year 1915, the 
expansion of the railway from Dakar to Bamako (Mali’s capital) was to facilitate the 
transportation of goods; especially, the groundnut expansion in the new Senegal oriental 
administrative capital, Tambacounda. Despite, several initiatives taken by French administrators 
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in setting lower rates for the railway, suppressing Senegal’s tax groundnut exports and imposing 
duty-free on Senegal’s import of groundnut, did not benefit the Senegalese farmers because 
France controlled the revenues. The beneficiaries of the groundnut, France’s Marseilles’ oil and 
soap industries along with textiles woolen industries were better situated to protest France’s tariff 
policies, but not the exploited Senegalese farmers.  
 France implemented Albert Sarraut’s development program, La Mise en valeur de nos 
colonies, a colonial pact of dependence, which was to turn Senegal into an estate or enterprise - 
basically, obligating Senegal to produce raw materials for the profit of the metropole.139 
However, such French ideals did not match with Senegalese farmers’ realities, because France 
placed extreme pressure on the Senegalese agricultural sector. France had already intensely 
exploited the former peanut basin in Wolof territories, which resulted in soil depletion due to 
lack of crop rotation, and later France moved the peanut basin of Senegal in the Serer’s region of 
the Sin-Saloum. The Serer of this region, became reluctant to switch traditional millet cultivation 
to groundnut, especially in Sine which remained as an official kingdom until 1969. France used 
(Sin-Saloum) as “a reservoir of soldiers during World War I and a provider of wealth at the same 
time.”140 Faye attributed the decline of the agricultural production to ‘demographic puncture,’ 
resulting in “fleeing population, end of seasonal farmers immigration, invasions of locusts, fall of 
the farm gate price, and increase of imported goods price.”141 The same process was repeated by 
the French in Kabuu (Casamance), turning the region as a reservoir of soldiers during WWII.142  
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The ramification of the single cash crop, peanut was not a concern, but Senegal still struggles to 
be a food-sufficient state because the peanut production excluded other crops. France exploited 
the poor farmers and collected taxes from them without meaningful returns for the farmers’ 
social mobility improvement.  
A creation of bureaucratization problem and corruption became the norm of developing 
the interior’s agriculture. France established Provident Societies that consisted of a president, 
vice-president, local African chiefs with added secretary-treasurer in 1930, all whom were 
appointed by the French administration. However, the system caused a disconnect with the 
farmers that viewed the appointed officials “not as bodies that sprang from their own needs and 
wishes, but as an arm of the state.”143 The economic, administrative, including its courts, 
chieftaincies and tax were inflexible (Bangura). The chieftain system implemented by France, 
had majority of the Muslim chefs de cantons from the Futanke’s nobility in the interior that 
spoke limited French. However, the force labor persisted as it benefited France and the Futanke’s 
serfdom. The slave issues continued to impact modern Senegal,144 especially in the region 
inhabited by the Futanke (Fouta Toro and Casamance) often resulting in lack of public services 
for the Maccubés145 or jiyaabe146 the descendants of slaves. A recent remark made concerning 
the development of the rural region, “the three regions composing Casamance (Ziguinchor, 
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Kolda, and Sédhiou) are among the poorest in Senegal,”147 along with Sine-Saloum (Koalack), 
“has one of the highest levels of poverty in the country.”148 The poverty in Senegal has been 
attributed to groundnut trade of the 1930s. 
The global economic power of France must be taken into consideration. France was the 
second largest global creditor with 45 billion francs (1880-1914).149 Therefore, there could be a 
strong possibility that France’s creditor position, influenced Senegalese elites, who chose 
continuation instead of severing relations. However, French economic policies were detrimental 
because France restricted Senegal’s exports, leading to the decline of certain products (1917-
1919),150 including groundnut products, cotton, fruit, vegetables, hides and skins. At worse, the 
politics of seeds (1920-1959) marked the beginning of the economic strangle of Senegal and the 
rest of the A.O.F. The Senegalese local price of the groundnut was one-third of France’s market 
price. The other problems stem from France’s institutional designs that became the major 
obstacle. Paris’ administrators conflicted with the central administrators of A.O.F, and it was in 
regards of the agricultural provisions and the peasantry cash crop that France wanted to integrate 
in the world economy. France tried to break the debt exploitation that tied the cultivators to the 
local merchants, but only to find itself exploiting the local peanut farmers. Consequently, the 
global economy was rapidly changing, and “heavily capitalized export-import firms had taken 
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over the role in the trading economy from the old Bordeaux firms.”151 Coupled with the falling 
price of the groundnut, reduction of groundnut cultivation and slow marketing, affected the 
economic interests of multiple actors such as the farmers, France industries, metis’ firms, and the 
A.O.F administration that benefited half of its revenues from custom duties of the import-export.  
France was less interested in modernizing the economy and Senegal’s economy remained 
status quo. To halt development, France placed a quota system on non-French products, and 
applied a price system for A.O.F products. The policies allowed France to dictate the price of 
Senegalese goods, as it heavily imported French made products in the Senegalese market. 
France’s implementation of protectionist policies against foreign competitors stunted the 
industrial development of Senegal and the rest of the A.O.F. Protectionism, a French tradition, 
became Senegal’s problem after decolonization. Henceforth, the implementation of the Zone 
Franc in 1945 by France introducing the Colonies Francaises d’Afrique franc (CFA) has 
continued preventing Senegal from being economically independent. This colonial currency 
(CFA franc or FCFA) fabricated in France has continued circulating as the national currency in 
Senegal and in fifteen African countries. CFA franc has been labeled as soft power means for 
France, because it ensured France’ sphere of influence in Senegal and the fifteen other African 
countries using the currency. The current President Sall said that, “Le franc CFA est une bonne 
monnaie à garder” (“The CFA is a good currency to keep”). This colonial currency (CFA franc 
or FCFA) and the West African Bank established by France, predated Senegal’s independence, 
and it could be only resolved between the elites.  
Senegalese, as well African intellectuals and soldiers that fought for France during WWI 
and WWII, developed political awareness regarding France’s imperialism and the global trend of 
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nationalist ideals. However, Senegal was economically limited as capital, means of production, 
freights and tariff were in France’s control. France responded with a deadly use of force in 
repressing all non-violent protests: Tirailleurs Sénégalais in Thiaroye (1944), Senegalese dock 
workers and railroad workers’ general strike (1945-1946). Lamine Gueye, a lawyer, founder of 
the Parti Socialiste Senegalais (PSS),152 and Leopold Sedar Senghor’s political mentor, served as 
the first Senegal’s French Senator in the French National Assembly. Gueye implemented Loi 
Lamine Gueye, which extended citizenship throughout French West Africa in 1946.153 However, 
France President De Gaulle desired assimilation policy, or federation, but no policy was 
implemented concerning reforming Senegal and A.O.F’ s economy. Although, the political 
struggle continued with the intellectual Negritude movement,154 along with the First and Second 
Black Congress writers,155 most of these intellectuals were elites affirming black identities 
theoretically. The main elite intellectuals such as Leopold Sedar Senghor, formed the Bloc 
Democratie Senegalais (BDS) out of the socialist camp with the economist, Mamadou Dia, a 
Senator (1948-1956). BDS promoted ‘African socialism;’ which was an untested idea of 
development that was influenced by Senghor’s Negrititude with the support of his Economic 
Advisor, Father Louis-Joseph Lebret, a French Dominican social scientist and philosopher; 
surprisingly, Lebret “was a cleric who had never explicitly renounced European imperialism, and 
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who continued to defend the importance of Europe’s playing a ‘civilizing role’ in the third 
world.”156  Senghor disagreed on the political and economic approaches with its African 
counterparts such as Modibo Keita, Sekou Toure and Mamadou Dia in dealing with France after 
decolonization– tensions that would continue to create tensions for Senegalese economic policy 
following independence. 
5.2 Post-Colonialism 
Independence of the former French African colonies have been debated in terms if it was 
only political freedom and or if it was also economic freedom. The French word “octroyer” (to 
grant), was part of General De Gaulle’s warning that there is a price to pay if Senegal and other 
French colonies in Africa choose to be independent. However, the Senegalese Black Frenchmen 
and metis ruling class, did not break away from the colonial links. Probably many people would 
be skeptical regarding my argument that Senegal lagged economically for much of its history 
because of its colonial legacy. The reason skeptics might assert to invalidate the argument, could 
be that Senegal’s economy and politics seized to be in France’s direct control following 
independence in 1960. Nonetheless, the available data indicate France remained as the dominant 
partner following the postcolonial era and this legacy has been well preserved by the Senegalese 
elites. 
President Senghor reinforced France-Senegal relationship because he did not believe that 
Senegal could be in charge of its own destiny without French interference, as he advocated for 
self-determination rather than independence.157 But did President Senghor have an alternative 
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option, as the President of France, General De Gaulle listed three choices for the French colonies: 
integration, autonomy, or independence during Referendum 1958? The former French colony, 
Algeria, gained independence by going to war with France, while Guinea opted for immediate 
independence and suffered economic repercussions. However, as Gueye’s Parti Socialiste 
Senegalais (PSS) and Senghor’s Bloc Democratie Senegalais (BDS) merged to form Union 
Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS, Senegalese Progressive Union), UPS voted “YES” to remain 
within the French community. Senghor’s desire was to remain with France as well. Senghor and 
most of UPS were not present during De Gaulle’s Referendum visit at Dakar on August 26, 1958. 
The UPS political elites made the agreement to stay with France without consulting the population. 
However, the mass of the Senegalese population led by religious marabouts, Senegalese women 
movement158 (Les Mamans de l’Independance)159 or (mbotaay) and other political parties like the 
Parti pour le Regroupment Africain (Party for African Regroupment) (PRS) and Parti Africain de 
L’Independance (African Independence Party) (PAI 1957-1980) voted “NON” opting for 
independence instead of autonomy. One of Senghor’s party members, Valdiodio N'diaye went 
against UPS decision and declare Senegal’s independence to De Gaulle, but the UPS’ “YES” vote 
was upheld on September 28, 1958.  
Why would the newly independent Senegalese elites not exercise full independence? As 
we saw in the last section, the choice to retain ties can be found in the founding elites’ biographies. 
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For instance, the founding father of the new nation, Senghor, was groomed by France since he was 
seven years old. Once he earned the Aggregation in French Grammar at the top prestigious French 
school, Ecole Normale Superieure of Sorbonne University, France granted him French nationality 
and he fought to defend France during WWII.  Senghor’s political career began in academia. He 
was dean of the French National Schools abroad, taught in several schools in France and trained 
French officials to better served Senegal. Influenced by Lamine Gueye to run for election in 
France’s National Assembly, Senghor became Deputy of transportation between Senegal and 
Mauritania. Despite Gueye’s (1951-57) and Senghor’s socialist stand and political fallout over 
1946 union strike, the socialist influence of Senghor was reinforced in France. Republicanism, 
socialism, Marxism, communism, nationalism, feminism, universalism and all other political 
“isms” collided and reconciled in Senghor’s world. After resigning from the Section francaise de 
L’Internationale ouvriere (SFIO) of parti socialiste (PSS), Senghor’s political party BDS 
dominated Senegal’s legislative elections of 1951. BDS consisted of radical young Senegalese that 
completed higher education in France compared to the moderate political party of Gueye’s PSS. 
Despite the merging of the two parties as UPS, the division persisted between the moderate and 
the radical,160 but Senghor was a moderate like his political mentor Gueye that supported France’s 
interest in Senegal. Next Senghor, held several government positions, serving as advisor to Edgar 
Faure and Michel Debre, former French Prime Ministers in the 1950s.161  The government position 
Senghor held as mayor of Thies (one of the city-states of the Serer kingdoms of Sine and Saloum) 
in 1956, was crucial in getting him acquainted with the interior. Additionally, Under President 
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Charles De Gaulle’s reign, Senghor was a member of the French commissions that drafted the 
French Constitution in 1946 and 1958.  
Senegal, as the capital of French West Africa was a status of grandeur, especially the four 
French communes’ status was no match to any other French colonies. The status served as 
motivating factor for the elites and the communes vote to remain with France. Taking into 
consideration that, as anti-colonial sentiment was spreading throughout the colonized world, 
France itself was going through economic reconstruction and political transformation during the 
period following the aftermath of World War II (1946-1958). France’s dismal economy, and the 
rise of the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union reorienting the geopolitics, 
left French elites with a nostalgic desire to reclaim its former glory as le grand empire. As a result, 
France passed numerous laws trying to preserve the empire. One such law, the (loi Lamine Gueye), 
and the Senegalese elites were at the forefront, galvanizing support in Africa for France leading 
the path toward modernization. By the year 1959, Senghor and Modibo Keita negotiated 
independence for Senegal and French Sudan (Mali) and Senghor and Keita formed the Federation 
of Mali by following Kwame Nkrumah’s idea of Union of African States. This resulted in a 
successful political strategy that prevented France’s balkanization of the African states. 
Unfortunately, after five months, Senegal and Mali seized federalism due to political struggle. 
Senegal opted for decentralization and Mali opted for centralization and, eventually, President 
Senghor governed Senegal by centralizing power.  
In actuality, Senegal has been a compartmentalized society created by France, and 
maintained by the Senegalese elites. The compartmentalized society, as indicated in the previous 
section, occurred through a gradual transition, involving pacification and violence. Political 
disunity and state disunity in Senegal derived from French rule. Notably, France cultivated an 
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elitist political class, and limited the development of Senegal within the four communes. Once 
Senegal broke away from Mali Federation, and was recognized as an independent state in 1960, 
President Senghor hired the majority of state officials from the metis families of the four 
communes to serve as ambassadors, lawyers, magistrates, journalists, and educators of the new 
nation.162 However, President Senghor was powerless without the accord of the rulers in the 
interior; the political elite conflicted with the marabout elite, which exacerbated the ethnic, 
religious, and regional division (See Jean-Marc Gastellu,163 Mamadou Diouf,164 and F.O. 
ALALADE165). Despite King Buur Mehacor of Sine, a frequent guest at Senghor father’s home, 
Buur Mehacor refused legitimizing Senghor regardless of Senghor’s Serer ethnicity, because, 
Lamine Gueye was the rightful ruler by maternal blood. However, this problem of leadership 
could be attributed to French rule destroying the traditional rulership. Furthermore, the other 
issue, Senghor spent most of his time in France; therefore, he was unknown to most Senegalese. 
Prime minister Dia (1960-62) and President of Senegal National Assembly Gueye (1960-68) 
supported Senghor in normalizing relations with the spiritual Muslim leaders of the Mouride and 
Tinajniyyah brotherhoods. In general, the main problem, President Senghor wanted absolute 
control. As a result, he fired all of the Senegalese’ officials with royal blood or the ministers with 
expertise and replaced them with officials that supported his rule. 
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Chapter 6 
 6.1 Transition   
Politics and economics have been inseparable in Senegal and France’s relationship. It 
should be made clear that the elitist interest groups remained entrenched in the politics and 
economy of Senegal. For example, by the year 1961 until 1962, Dia visited of heads of states in 
Scandinavia, Yugoslavia, Washington, London, Brussels. But the visit to Khrushchev of the Soviet 
Union angered France, as well Senghor who was an anti-communist. The year 1962 marked a 
missed opportunity for Senegal’s development. UPS was engulfed in crisis, the tensions between 
President Senghor and his Prime Minister Dia’s development approaches conflicted over French 
interest.  Prime Minister Dia’s goal was to diversify Senegal’s economic partners and not rely 
solely for Senegal’s dependency to France. In contrast, President Senghor favored political 
clientelism, which enabled corruption in all of Senegal’s institutions. On the other hand, Dia’s 
economic reformation, structured the marabout elites’ role, and established creditors that benefited 
the rural farmer. It was an animation rurale plan for the educational, political, and economic 
development of the rural. The plan was not welcomed by President Sanghor’s nor his allies in 
French industries. In general, it was a dependent relationship between French elites and Senegalese 
elites, connecting back to the marabout elites’ relationship with the state, but also the talibe 
(disciples) farmers dependency to its marabout.  
At the very beginning of its independence, Senegal’s institutional design was problematic, 
and still in need of restructuring. One of the main economic institutions, Chambre De Commerce 
had a majority of French employees and a French president for decades following independence; 
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Mr Henry Charles Gallenca, Président de la chambre de commerce de Dakar (1960-1969),166 and 
Senegalese political elites in Senghor’s camp, plotted a motion of censure against Dia, in which 
80 members voted for the motion. As a result, “Four of the Ministers in Mamadou Dia's cabinet 
were tried with him. Ibrahima Sarr (Development), Joseph M'Baye (Rural Economy), 
and Valdiodio N'Diaye (Finance) were sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, while Alioune Tall 
(Information) received five years in prison plus a 10- year suspension of his civil rights.”167 
President Senghor repatriated Jean Alfred Diallo from France to replace the Senegalese Army 
General Fall for an attempt to neutralize Fall’s support of Dia. Interestingly, the third President of 
Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, an economist and a lawyer, served as Dia’s attorney, only to be 
pardoned by President Senghor by the year 1974. However, the marabouts elites within Senegal 
confreres: Falilou Mbacke (Mouride), El Hadj Ibrahima Niass (Tinajniyyah), El Hadj Seydou 
Nourou Tall (Tinajniyyah) sided with President Senghor’s decision for the imprisonment of Dia, 
except Abdoul Aziz Sy (Tinajniyyah) that remained silent on the matters. This goes to show 
religion wasn’t a factor because Senghor was a Catholic and was supported by marabout elites. 
The consolidation of power enabled President Senghor to re-establish the colonial 
institutions with modifications; a triangular economic reform, in which the marabout elites 
controlled the agricultural cooperatives. The marabouts would buy the production of the peanut 
from their disciples with the state’s funds. Generally, on an advance payment, and in this case, the 
marabout replaced French intermediaries. In return, France continued to benefit as the Senegalese 
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state sell the peanut to France in CFA instead of the French Franc, and the result of such 
exploitation impacted Senegal’s growth rate with a quasi-stagnation of imports (1960-1970). 
Senegal’s Constitution was reformed by President Senghor in 1959, 1960, 1963, as he presented 
himself as the only presidential candidate for the 1963 and 1973 elections. Senghor’s restricted 
democracy was challenged by the May 1968 Senegalese student revolt, such as Omar Blondin 
Diop168 and the general strike of Senegalese workers, which then led President Senghor to establish 
one-party state rule. More in depth information was provided by Bartlett  and Vavrus regarding 
the transformation of the French control of Senegal’s education system that demanded an 
Africanization reform for more Senegalese faculty.169 Despite President Senghor’s nomination of 
his dauphin or Protégé, Abdou Diouf as his Prime Minister (1970-1980), Senegal’s economy was 
in great turmoil as it grappled with drought, coupled with 1970s global energy oil crisis and the 
great inflation of interest rates.  
Finally, once legal opposition was reconstituted, President Senghor granted Abdoulaye 
Wade to establish his political party, Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (Senegalese Democratic 
Party-PDS). President Senghor’s UPS became Parti Socialist (Socialist Party) (PS), while the 
clandestine political party, P.A.I remerged with Dia’s Coordination de l'opposition senegalaise 
unie (coordinating the Unified Senegalese Opposition-COSU).170  At the same time, Cheikh Anta 
Diop established Rassemblement national democratique (National Democratic Rally-RND) with 
its editorials Siggi and Taxaw171 written in French and Wolof that advocated civic duties and 
                                                 
168 Zeilig Leo. Revolt and protest: student politics and activism in sub-Saharan Africa. Tauris 
Academic Studies 2007:170 
169Bartlett Lesley, Vavrus Frances. Critical Approaches to Comparative Education Vertical Case 
Studies from Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan 2009: 44. 
170Gellar, Sheldon. Democracy in Senegal 45 
171Gellar, Sheldon. Democracy in Senegal 80 
    Senegal’s unsustainable economic growth by Amadou Konteye 
 54 
denounced mal-governance. However, President Senghor excluded Dia and Diop’s left-leaning 
political parties’ participation in elections. Wade ran as the only opposition candidate against 
Senghor during the election of 1978, and as riot erupted after the ballot, President Senghor 
imprisoned Wade for his nationalist political ideologies. 
By the year 1981, at 74 years old, President Senghor decided to resign, and handed power 
to his chosen successor, Abdou Diouf (1981-2000). Before stepping down, President Senghor 
implemented President de Gaulle’s idea of Organisation international de la Francophonie. 
“Senghor soon made use of it to accord legitimacy to African literature. Senghor saw 
francophonie as a Trojan horse that could introduce African literature into the French 
universities.”172 As a member of Tinajniyyah, Diouf’s twenty years reign, was status quo. 
President Senghor had placed key political elites that made President Diouf’s transition 
unchallenged. President Diouf agreed with the establishment of Senegambia Confederation with 
President Dawda Jawara of Gambia (1982-1989);173 however, it was short-lived. Three general 
elections were held in 1983, 1988174 and 1993, while Diouf remained unbeaten by Wade; 
although,  Wade was imprisoned for “murder in May 1993 of Maitre Babacar Seye, Vice-
President of the Constitutional Council,” the charges were eventually dropped against Wade.175 
The Diombor, (the Hare) was Wade, the nightmare of President Diouf; he was “arrested and 
jailed several times for his political activities, but also served twice as minister under Mr 
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Diouf.”176 However, in like manner to Senghor, President Diouf faced crises, such as Senegal-
Mauritania Border War (1989-1991), an invalid school year in 1988, and in 1994, the riots led by 
students intensified. Since the 1980s, President Diouf faced growing tensions by Mouvement des 
Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) in Casamance, Senegal’s southern province; 
unequal distribution of resources, led MFDC to seek independence, as the local population 
supported the cause. Coupled with the persistent drought and climate change, Senegal’s economy 
was in bad shape as it was in the recovery phase. At worst, President Diouf’s agreement with the 
devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 led to more deterioration of Senegal’s economy. 
After twenty-six years in the opposition, Wade, a member of Mouride, was elected 
President in 2000. Surprisingly, within twelve years at the helm, Senegal experienced a true 
democracy, as well economic growth. Simply, President Wade had a vision, as he was known as 
“Gorgui” old-man in Wolof when he assumed power, and also as LE BÂTISSEUR (The Builder). 
All of the recent infrastructure works stem from Wade’s time. President Wade restructured 
Senegal’s market by diversifying economic partners, as well the political institutions, along with 
constitutional reform in 2001. As a former university professor, President Wade had also 
reformed the educational system. In addition, President Wade was successful to establish peace 
and restore justice with MFDC. President Wade was re-elected to lead Senegal in the general 
election held in 2007.  
Nonetheless, Wade’s presidency was a period of tensions between France and Senegal. 
France newly elected President Nicolas Sarkozy visited Dakar, Senegal, where he delivered a 
speech addressing to the Senegalese students at the University of Cheikh Anta Diop. The speech 
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covered various aspects, such as the tragic colonialization, the double traditions shared between 
Africa and Europe, but the insulting part of such speech, as President Sarkozy said, 
Le drame de l’Afrique, c’est que l’homme africain n’est pas assez entré dans l’histoire. 
Le paysan africain, qui depuis des millénaires, vit avec les saisons, dont l’idéal de vie 
est d’être en harmonie avec la nature, ne connaît que l’éternel recommencement du 
temps rythmé par la répétition sans fin des mêmes gestes et des mêmes paroles. 
Dans cet imaginaire où tout recommence toujours, il n’y a de place ni pour l’aventure 
humaine, ni pour l’idée de progrès.177 
 
The African farmer has been and was the main exploited Individual in the colonial legacy of France 
and Senegal; therefore, as the exploitation persisted, it made it difficult for the farmer to improve 
its condition. Regardless of such insulting remark, the divorce between Senegal and France would 
be unthinkable, Senghor was married to a French woman, Diouf married a metise, and Wade 
married a French woman. Despite the remarkable achievements, President Wade faced backlash 
from the population (Y’en a marre178 and M23179), who refused the alteration of the Senegal’s 
Constitution180 and grooming of Wade’ son to become President; as a result of the 2012 general 
election, Wade lost to his former Prime Minister Macky Sall.181 In brief, President Sall has been 
criticized by Senegalese, for being a ‘puppet of France;’ under President Sall’s leadership, Senegal 
market reverted back to France’s control. 
6.2 Conclusion   
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Senegal’s current international trade has been based on comparative advantage, yet I 
cannot name a single comparative advantage Senegal has in the global market. When questioned 
regarding economic growth of a country, the Economist responded by listing the four factors that 
spur growth: physical capital, human capital, technology, and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
But a number of studies examined, talk about Senegal’s peanut industry as a comparative 
advantage. Yet, Senegal has been vulnerable to the shocks of the global market, interest rate, and 
trade term. Politically, Senegal is a country recognized as a model democracy with stable 
institutions, but economically questioned. Economists divided the factors of production as land, 
labor, and capital and agreed that no country could be productive in all three because of 
endogenous and exogenous factors implication. In this context France would be considered an 
exogenous factor, while the Senegalese elites, the endogenous factor impeding on the 
development of Senegal.  
The recent data shows that FDI is positive and that remittances flow into Senegal. But 
technology shouldn’t be a problem for Senegal if Rwanda is ranked third in technology; Rwanda 
is being mentioned because in a length of 25 years, its development is a model example in Africa. 
Given that Senegal is a primary resource exporter, in which its currency is tied to France, and a 
market dominated by France, the only explanation is blatantly clear that France and Senegalese 
elites are the causes. Today, multi-corporation companies extract Senegal’s natural resources; 
however, there is no records showing multi-corporation companies’ contribution in the overall 
society. Having recently travel to Senegal, I attest that there is a deep divide between the urban 
and rural, but such disparity has its origin in the colonial period.  
There are many reasons given for the lack of reforms by the Senegalese elites but they 
particularly fear losing privileges vis a vis France and the fraternity that the two countries share at 
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the international level. France has been a member of the Security Council at the United Nations, 
and Senegal has been the most important ally of France in Africa. Perhaps, France’s financial 
approval for Senegal to receive loans from the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) could be other possibilities explaining Senegalese elites’ loyalty to France. In fact, 
Senegal was the first African nation that the WB and IMF approved for loans during the 1970s 
global crisis. Given that political interest has been prioritized over the national interest, the 
Senegalese population have been divided politically and economically regarding their relationship 
with France.  
Besides the CFA franc, and France being the dominant economic partner, France has been 
maintaining a military base with a sizable unit of 1200 soldiers in Senegal’s capital, Dakar. France’ 
military presence in Senegal, which dates back to the colonial era, has been also contested. 
President Wade demanded the closure of the French military base,182 but the current President Sall 
reopened the base and reverted back to the old business model. Interestingly, President Sall’s 
regime includes Ousmane Tenor Dieng, President du Haut Conseil des Collectivites territoriales 
(HCCT) and Moustapha Niass, President of Senegal National Assembly. These are two key elected 
officials that also have served at top government positions during President Senghor and President 
Diouf’s forty years reign. France and Senegal’s relationship has been a renewed affair under 
President Sall, as Sall has former President Diouf as advisor. Diouf, the second Secretary General 
of the International Organisation de La Francophonie (OIF) (2003-2014), revealed that Senegal 
cannot break away from France. President Sall implemented an economic plan, Le Sénégal 
emergent, which focused in the agriculture sector, as Senegal’s debt rises. In the year 2016, 
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President Sall amended the Constitution by limiting the president term from seven years to five 
years. However, corruption remained as an incurable disease, coupled with President Sall’s 
undemocratic principle, the disqualification of opposition183 and imprisonment of political 
opponent;184 all of President Sall’s political maneuvers, serve as a reminder of President Senghor’s 
“elimination of opposition parties.”185 
What have we learned? Conflicting elites’ interest creates institutional design problems. 
What have we found is the root of the problem? The colonial legacy maintained by elites. What 
are the solutions? Log-term investments in education, equal distribution of resources within the 
urban and rural regions, and equal partnership with France and any other nation in the world 
willing to do business.  
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